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Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter: How 
Did Private Businesses Become Government “Agencies” 
Under the Washington Public Records Act? 
Jeffrey A. Ware† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In April of 2008, thirty-six years after the Washington Public 
Records Act became law,1 Washington courts made an interesting dis-
covery: some private businesses are government “agencies” subject to 
the Washington Public Records Act (PRA).2  The case, Clarke v. Tri-
Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, concerned a privately run animal 
control and sheltering service with which the Animal Control Authority 
of the Cities of Richland, Pasco, and Kennewick, Washington, contracted 
to perform animal control services.3  A citizen sued under the PRA after 
being denied her request to review Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control 
Shelter’s (TCAC) euthanasia logbooks, and the Washington Court of 
Appeals, Division III, held that TCAC, a private, for-profit corporation, 
was an “other local public agency” under the Act.4  Thus, for the first 
time, a privately owned and run business was subject to the government 
agency requirements of the Washington Public Records Act. 
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 1. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56 (2008) (originally enacted as part of the Public Disclosure Act 
(PDA), WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17 (1972)).  In 2005, the Public Records Act (PRA) portion of the 
Public Disclosure Act was renamed and re-codified as a distinct chapter of the Revised Code of 
Washington.  Thus, PRA and PDA are used interchangeably in this Note—use is determined solely 
by the date of the reference and not by any substantive difference in law. 
 2. See Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, 144 Wash. App. 185, 181 P.3d 881 
(2008). 
 3. Id. at 188, 181 P.3d 882. 
 4. Id. at 185, 181 P.3d 881. 
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The Clarke court did not issue its holding entirely out of the blue, 
but instead added to thirty years of evolving Washington PRA jurispru-
dence.  Early decisions considered not whether private entities were cov-
ered under the Act, but whether “quasi-governmental agencies” could be 
exempt from disclosing records.5  In the early 1990s, questions arose as 
to whether “private” entities created by government agencies and led by 
government officials were subject to the PRA, and the state attorney gen-
eral introduced a “functional equivalency” analytical framework.6  Soon 
afterward, Washington courts accepted the functional-equivalency con-
cept but expanded the attorney general’s interpretation to include private 
corporations created and managed by public agencies and officials.7  This 
analysis became known as the Telford test.8  Within the past few years, 
parties have challenged the limits of Telford to determine whether private 
corporations providing public services under government contract may 
also be “agencies” subject to the PRA.  In Spokane Research & Defense 
Fund v. West Central Community Development Association,9 the court of 
appeals held that a contracting non-profit provider of government-funded 
services was not an agency subject to the PDA.10  One year later, howev-
er, that same court held in Clarke that a for-profit corporation can be the 
functional equivalent of an agency and thus subject to the PRA.11  Thus, 
the PRA’s definition of agency has been turned on its head through in-
cremental actions. 
Those who support “open government” may celebrate Clarke’s 
holding because if other Washington courts follow this precedent, gov-
ernment agencies may no longer hide the details of their activities behind 
the smokescreen of “contracting out” government services.  Even those 
alarmed by Clarke may see the result as an aberration whose effects will 
                                                 
 5. See Graham v. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, 86 Wash. 2d 624, 548 P.2d 310 (1976) (holding that 
the Washington Bar Association, although statutorily authorized to carry out certain state duties, was 
not an “agency” subject to the mandatory disclosure of documents). 
 6. See 1991 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. No. 5 (introducing a framework borrowed from other states 
to determine whether an entity was the “functional equivalent” of an agency, opining that the Small 
Business Export Finance Assistance Center was not equivalent, and thus, the center was not an 
“agency” subject to the PDA). 
 7. See Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm’rs, 95 Wash. App. 149, 974 P.2d 886 (1999), 
review denied, 138 Wn.2d 1015, 989 P.2d 1143 (1999) (holding that the Washington State Associa-
tion of Counties and the Washington Association of County Officials were the functional equivalents 
of “other agencies” subject to the PDA). 
 8. See, e.g., Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, 144 Wash. App. 185, 192, 181 
P.3d 881, 884 (2008); Spokane Research & Def. Fund v. West Cent. Cmty. Dev. Ass’n, 133 Wash. 
App. 602, 605, 137 P.3d 120, 121 (2006), review denied, 160 Wash. 2d 1006, 158 P.3d. 614 (2007). 
 9. Spokane Research & Def. Fund v. West Cen. Comm. Dev. Ass’n, 133 Wash. App. 602, 137 
P.3d 120 (2006), review denied, 160 Wash. 2d 1006, 158 P.3d 614 (2007). 
 10. Id. at 602, 137 P.3d at 120. 
 11. Clarke, 144 Wash. App. at 185, 181 P.3d at 881. 
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be felt only in rare instances where government agencies delegate their 
responsibilities on a wholesale level to avoid their statutory responsibili-
ties.  However, I argue that the Clarke court arrived at a deeply flawed 
decision by misreading both the PRA’s statutory text and the applicable 
case law while defying common sense: by definition, private businesses 
cannot be government agencies.  Clarke’s precedent is dangerous be-
cause it opens the door for citizens to invade the privacy of organizations 
with which the government does business, increases the potential costs 
and difficulties of government contracting, and ultimately, harms the 
democratic process by limiting how our elected representatives can de-
cide whether and how best to provide government services.  Finally, 
even if Clarke’s specific result—making euthanasia records publicly 
available—is laudable, the Washington Legislature should carefully 
amend the PRA to cover such records without fully subjecting private 
businesses to the extensive and burdensome requirements of the Act. 
This Note analyzes the facts and reasoning behind Clarke’s agency 
holding, explains how the court was wrong to use and then misapply the 
Telford functional-equivalency test, discusses the consequences of sub-
jecting government contractors to the PRA, and offers solutions to reme-
dy the mistakes in Clarke.  To begin, Part II reviews the facts of Clarke 
and the requirements of Washington’s Public Records Act.  Part III then 
examines the evolution of Washington’s Telford functional-equivalency 
test as applied up to, and through, Clarke.  Part IV explains the several 
reasons why Clarke was wrongly decided and how the result produced a 
dangerous precedent.  Finally, Part V recommends solutions that prevent 
future holdings similar to Clarke while remaining faithful to the PRA’s 
purpose. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter 
In 1999, Bruce and Sandy Young formed the Tri-Cities Animal 
Shelter, a Washington non-profit corporation, whose purpose was four-
fold: (1) to shelter animals in need for the public good; (2) to promote 
spay and neutering programs; (3) to educate the public in the hope of 
ending the need for euthanasia; and (4) to actively prevent cruelty toward 
animals.12  One year later, the Youngs formed a for-profit corporation, 
Tri-City Animal Control & Sheltering Services, Inc., (TCAC), with the 
stated purpose in its articles of incorporation of engaging in the business 
                                                 
 12. Id. at 189, 181 P.3d at 881. 
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of providing animal control and sheltering services for animals in Benton 
and Franklin counties.13 
In 2004, TCAC executed a Personal Services Agreement with the 
Animal Control Authority (ACA) of Richland, Pasco, and Kennewick14 
(the Tri-Cities) for TCAC to provide animal control services for the Tri-
Cities area.15  This contract included numerous animal control duties16 
and required TCAC employees to take oaths of office as animal control 
officers,17 but it limited TCAC’s police powers.18  The agreement also 
required TCAC to “[a]rrange and/or provide for the humane euthanasia 
and disposal of unwanted animals.”19  TCAC operated in a municipally 
leased building and paid no rent to the municipality, but it was not per-
mitted to conduct private business at the facility.20  TCAC was also re-
quired to keep records and provide monthly reports to the ACA, but it 
was not subject to annual audits by the State.21 
Leonora Clarke, a private citizen, thought that TCAC was violating 
the euthanasia protocol set out in TCAC’s contract, and on August 3, 
2005, Ms. Clarke made a public records request for all of TCAC’s eutha-
nasia logbooks.22  TCAC responded that it was not a public agency sub-
ject to the PDA, rejected Ms. Clarke’s request, and directed her to the 
Animal Control Authority.23  Ms. Clarke’s attorney then forwarded her 
records request to the Kennewick City Attorney.  The City responded 
that it did not possess, and thus could not produce, the logbooks she 
sought.24 
Ms. Clarke then filed suit against both TCAC and the ACA with 
motions for show-cause hearings.25  Ms. Clarke first alleged that TCAC 
                                                 
 13. Id. 
 14. The Cities of Pasco, Kennewick, and Richland formed the Animal Control Authority in 
1998 through an interlocal cooperative agreement.  Id. 
 15. Id. at 189, 181 P.3d at 883. 
 16. Id.  TCAC’s duties under the contract included: 
Apprehension and impound of stray dogs and cats, impound of distressed animals, re-
moval of dead animals from roads, disposal of dead animals, elimination of wild or vi-
cious animals, animal regulation enforcement including citation authority for violation of 
animal regulatory ordinances, animal sheltering, acceptance and care of animals, reunifi-
cation, adoption disposal of unclaimed animals, and euthanasia. 
Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.  TCAC was not permitted to issue citations for misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor 
violations.  Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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was subject to the PDA, but the trial court held that TCAC was not a 
public agency, either as defined by the PDA or as a functional equivalent 
under Telford.26  Next, Ms. Clarke alleged that the ACA should release 
the log books, but the trial court found that the log books were not pre-
pared or retained by the ACA, and thus were not covered under the 
PRA.27  Consequently, the trial court denied Ms. Clarke’s motions to 
show cause and dismissed her PDA action against both TCAC and the 
ACA.28 
Ms. Clarke appealed the trial court’s holding that TCAC was not a 
public agency to the Washington Court of Appeals, Division III, remov-
ing the ACA from the case.29  The court of appeals first held that to be 
considered an agency, TCAC must qualify as an “other local public 
agency.”30  The court then chose to apply the Telford functional-
equivalency test because it found “other local public agency” to be am-
biguous with respect to TCAC.31  After balancing the Telford factors, the 
court held that TCAC was subject to the PDA as the functional equiva-
lent of an “other agency.”32  Accordingly, the court of appeals held that 
the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying the motion to show 
cause, and it remanded the case.33 
B.  Washington Public Records Act 
1.  Purpose of the PRA 
For a generation, Washington citizens have been accustomed to the 
right of free and open access to state and local government records.  The 
Public Records Act (PRA) was originally approved and enacted by 
Washington voters in 1972 as part of Initiative 276, the Public Disclosure 
                                                 
 26. Id. at 190, 181 P.3d at 883–84. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 190, 181 P.3d at 884. 
 29. Id. at 190, 181 P.3d at 883–84. 
 30. Id. at 191, 181 P.3d at 884. 
 31. Id. at 191–92, 181 P.3d at 884. 
 32. Id. at 195, 181 P.3d at 886. 
On balance, we conclude TCAC is the functional equivalent of a public agency.  While 
TCAC has some non-public functions and characteristics, the fact that it performs a go-
vernmental function dependent upon its relationship with the local government, receives 
the bulk of its funding from taxpayer money to perform that function, and is subject to 
regular government oversight, all tip the scale in favor of finding that TCAC is the func-
tional equivalent of a public agency. 
Id. 
 33. Id. 
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Act (PDA),34 and the PRA was renamed and re-codified by the Legisla-
ture as a distinct chapter under RCW 42.56 in 2005.35  The PRA clearly 
directs state and local agencies to make their records freely available for 
citizens to review because this accessibility serves an essential function 
in the democratic process: 
The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agen-
cies that serve them. . . .  The people insist on remaining informed 
so that they may maintain control over the instruments that they 
have created.  This chapter shall be liberally construed and its 
exemptions narrowly construed to promote this public policy and 
to assure that the public interest will be fully protected.36 
Washington courts, led by the Washington Supreme Court, have consis-
tently enforced a liberal construction of the PDA.37  Thus, courts will 
find that agency records must be disclosed for almost any reason held by 
a requestor38 or for no reason at all.39 
2.  Requirements for Agencies Under the Washington Public Records 
Act 
The PRA subjects government agencies to a series of requirements.  
First, agencies must publish and prominently display all agency proce-
dures for public inspection.40  Second, agencies must maintain indexes of 
various records held by the agencies,41 make these indexes and all agen-
cy records not exempt from disclosure available to the public,42 provide 
facilities for viewing and copying public records,43 and establish times 
                                                 
 34. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17 (1976).  Initiative 276 also included laws on campaign finance 
and authorized the creation of a public disclosure commission.  See id.  Statutes governing lobbying 
and campaign finance remain in § 42.17 today.  WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17 (2008). 
 35. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.56.010, .020 (2008). 
 36. Id. § 42.56.030. See also id. § 42.17.010(2).  Initiative 276 also included the following 
policy statement: “That, mindful of the right of individuals to privacy and of the desirability of the 
efficient administration of government, full access to information concerning the conduct of gov-
ernment on every level must be assured as a fundamental and necessary precondition to the sound 
governance of a free society.”  Id. (in comments). 
 37. See Livingston v. Cedeno, 164 Wash. 2d 46, 50, 186 P.3d 1055, 1057 (2008) (“It is well 
settled that a reviewing court interprets the disclosure provisions of the public records act liberally 
and the exemptions from disclosure narrowly.”). 
 38. See Yakima Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Yakima, 77 Wash. App. 319, 328, 890 P.2d 544, 
549 (1995) (holding that any government expenditure of public funds is within the public interest 
protected by the PDA). 
 39. See Livingston, 164 Wash. 2d at 50, 186 P.3d at 1057 (“In general, an agency must disclose 
a public record unless a statutory exemption applies.”). 
 40. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.040 (2008). 
 41. Id. § 42.56.070(3). 
 42. Id. § 42.56.070(1). 
 43. Id. § 42.56.080. 
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for inspection and copying.44  Finally, each agency must appoint and 
identify a public records officer, whose responsibilities are to serve as a 
point of contact for members of the requesting public and to oversee the 
agency’s compliance with the PRA.45  Once a record has been requested, 
the agency must respond to the requestor within five business days by (1) 
providing the requested record; (2) acknowledging receipt of the request 
and providing a reasonable estimate of the time required to respond to 
the request; or (3) denying the public record request.46 
The amount of time and resources required for agencies to fulfill 
these requests can be extensive.47  The financial costs of non-compliance, 
however, can be even greater if a court awards the requestor attorney’s 
fees, costs, and penalties ranging from five to one-hundred dollars per 
day.48  Faced with the challenges and risks imposed by the PRA, state 
and local agencies must invest significant resources and effort to fully 
comply with the Act.49 
                                                 
 44. Id. § 42.56.090. 
 45. Id. § 42.56.580. 
 46. Id. § 42.56.520. 
 47. Washington state government has not released cumulative totals for the cost of state and 
local agencies to comply with the Public Records Act.  However, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
this may run into the tens of millions of dollars annually.  For example, in 2007, the Washington 
Department of Corrections spent more than 12,000 hours at a cost of more than $250,000 to respond 
to requests from prisoners.  Rachel La Corta, Official: Felons Don’t Have Rights to Public Records, 
SEATTLE TIMES, at B5, available at 2008 WLNR 10962783.  The City of Prosser (population 5,077) 
estimates that it spent at least $75,000 and more than 100 working days responding to the requests of 
a single person.  Jim Brunner, Bills in State Legislature Seek to Rein in Records “Fishing,” SEATTLE 
TIMES, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 3455020.  To handle PRA requests, the City of Seattle em-
ploys fifty-five public disclosure officers representing thirty-seven different departments.  Seat-
tle.gov, Public Disclosure Officers (as of Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.seattle.gov/publicdisclosu 
re/pdo.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).  Multiplied by hundreds of state and local agencies, the total 
cost spent in cost and employee time complying with the PRA probably runs into the tens of millions 
of dollars annually. 
 48. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.550(4) (2008).  For example, the Washington Supreme 
Court ordered King County to pay Armen Yousoufian $371,340 plus reasonable attorney fees and 
costs for delay in releasing requested public records. Yousoufian v. Office of Ron Sims, No. 80081-
2, 2010 WL 1225083, at *12 (Wash. Mar. 25, 2010).  An agency also risks lawsuits from third par-
ties if the agency wrongfully discloses records that might violate a person’s right to privacy under 
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.050 (2008).  See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.550(4) (2008); See also Bel-
levue John Does 1-11 v. Bellevue School Dist. #405, 164 Wash. 2d 199, 189 P.3d 139 (2008) (hold-
ing that the identities of teachers against whom allegations of sexual misconduct were made could be 
released under the PRA only if those allegations were substantiated).  Thus, if the school districts in 
the Bellevue John Does case had originally released the identities of those teachers, as many, includ-
ing three dissenting justices, thought the PRA required, those teachers would have had an actionable 
tort against the school districts for invasion of their privacy.  See id. 
 49. See generally Public Records Act Model Rules, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 44-14 (2007).  The 
Washington Attorney General promulgated fifty-five pages of model rules for agencies to follow to 
meet PRA requirements.  Id.  Of particular importance is the training of agency employees: 
The [PRA] is complicated and compliance requires training. . . . The attorney general’s 
office strongly encourages agencies to provide thorough and ongoing training to agency 
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III.  THE WASHINGTON PUBLIC RECORDS ACT, AS APPLIED TO 
“OTHER AGENCIES” 
A.  “Public Agency” Defined 
Under the PRA, only public agencies are subject to the Act,50 and 
agencies are defined as follows: 
“Agency” includes all state agencies and all local agencies.  
“State agency” includes every state office, department, division, 
bureau, board, commission, or other state agency.  “Local agen-
cy” includes every county, city, town, municipal corporation, 
quasi-municipal corporation, or special purpose district, or any 
office, department, division, bureau, board, commission, or 
agency thereof, or other local public agency.51 
Then, by definition, all entities that are not “agencies” are not subject to 
the PRA.52  This form-over-function distinction creates an apparent 
bright-line rule that all courts should be able to follow: is the record kee-
per a governmental entity or not? 
The list of state and local entities subject to the PRA is extensive, 
including many that perform functions also performed by private organi-
zations—education, health care, port management, transportation sys-
tems, and utilities, to name a few.53  The strength of using the Act’s 
“agency” definitional threshold is that requestors are not required to de-
termine whether the records sought concern activities that are, by defini-
tion, “governmental.”  Thus, a government agency cannot avoid the PRA 
by claiming that the record requested concerns a “non-governmental en-
terprise” function.54  Conversely, private companies that provide the 
                                                                                                             
staff on public records compliance.  All agency employees should receive basic training 
on public records compliance and records retention; public records officers should re-
ceive more intensive training. 
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 44-14-00005 (2007). 
 50. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) (2008).  (“Each agency . . . shall make available for 
public inspection and copying all public records, unless the record falls within . . . specific exemp-
tions.”). 
 51. Id. § 42.56.010(1). 
 52. See id. 
 53. For example, within Seattle’s city limits exist such “agencies” as the University of Wash-
ington, Seattle School District No. 1, University Hospital, Harborview Hospital, Port of Seattle, 
King County Metro Public Transit and Sewer, Sound Transit, Seattle City Light, and Seattle Public 
Utilities. 
 54. For example, Seattle City Light is an electric utility owned and managed by the City of 
Seattle, and as such, it is an “agency” under RCW 42.56.010(1).  Seattle City Light cannot legally 
assert that its records are exempt from the PRA by claiming that provision of electricity is a “non-
governmental enterprise activity” because private utilities also provide this function. 
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same services as government entities do not fall under the PRA when 
providing competing “government services.”55 
However, this rule fails to account for situations in which the dis-
tinction between “public agency” and “private entity” appears murky.  
Examples of such situations may include lawmakers extending statutory 
authority to private organizations; governments creating “private enti-
ties” to conduct only privately allowed activities; or governments con-
tracting agency-level functions to private contractors.56  Washington 
courts have stepped in to fill this gap. 
B.  The Telford Functional-Equivalency Test 
1.  Adoption of the Functional-Equivalency Test 
The Washington Supreme Court has left it to the Washington Court 
of Appeals to interpret “ambiguity” in the PRA and establish case law 
determining whether private organizations may be considered agencies 
under the Act.57  In so doing, the Washington Court of Appeals has insti-
tuted a four-factor test to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a 
private entity is an agency subject to the PRA: (1) whether the entity per-
forms a government function; (2) the level of government funding; (3) 
the extent of government involvement or regulation; and (4) whether the 
entity was created by the government.58  Although the wording of this 
test has remained constant since it was introduced in the early 1990s, 
courts’ interpretations of it and the private entities subject to this analysis 
have evolved over time. 
The functional-equivalency test was first applied to the Washington 
Public Disclosure Act in a 1991 Attorney General Opinion Letter.59  In 
determining whether a non-profit organization authorized by statute fell 
                                                 
 55. In contrast to the Seattle City Light example, Puget Sound Energy, one of Washington’s 
largest private electric utilities, does not fall under the Act because, regardless of whether one de-
fines electricity provision as a governmental function, Puget Sound Energy does not qualify as a 
state or local agency under RCW 42.56.010(1). 
 56. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(1) (2008). 
 57. See, e.g., Spokane Research & Def. Fund v. West Cent. Cmty. Dev. Ass’n, 133 Wash. App. 
602, 604, 137 P.3d 120, 121 (2006), review denied, 160 Wash. 2d 1006, 158 P.3d. 614 (2007); Tel-
ford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm’rs, 95 Wash. App. 149, 974 P.2d 886 (1999), review denied, 
138 Wash. 2d 1015, 989 P.2d 1143 (1999).  By denying review, the Washington Supreme Court let 
stand the Court of Appeals’ determination that the definition of agency may be ambiguous with 
respect to a private entity.  See Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 156, 974 P.2d at 891. 
 58. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 44-14-01001 (2007) (citing 2002 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. No. 2; 
Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 149, 974 P.2d at 886; 1991 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. No. 5). 
 59. 1991 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. No. 5.  State Senator Ray Moore requested an opinion from the 
attorney general about whether the Small Business Export Finance Assistance Center, a non-profit 
organization established by statute and governed and managed by directors appointed by the gover-
nor and confirmed by the Senate, was subject to the PDA.  Id. 
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under the PDA, the attorney general was unable to find any reported 
Washington decisions construing the definition of agency under the 
PDA.60  The attorney general then found that other jurisdictions used a 
“functional equivalency” test and determined that this was consistent 
with the liberal construction of the PDA and the narrower rationale in 
Graham v. Washington State Bar Association.61  The attorney general 
borrowed a four-factor functional-equivalency test from a Connecticut 
case.62  Finally, after applying the four-factor test to the Small Business 
Export Finance Assistance Center, the attorney general concluded that 
this entity was not an agency under the PDA and was thus not subject to 
public records requests.63 
2.  Judicial Expansion of “Agency” Under Telford 
The Washington Attorney General’s functional-equivalency analy-
sis was finally tested by Washington courts several years later in Telford 
v. Thurston County Board of Commissioners.64  Paul Telford, a private 
citizen, sued the Thurston County Board of Commissioners, the Wash-
ington State Association of Counties (WSAC), and the Washington As-
sociation of County Officials (WACO), alleging that they used taxpayer 
                                                 
 60. Id.  The attorney general did comment that “in other situations, the Washington court has 
stated that the meaning of the term ‘agency’ depends on its context.  Accordingly, even though the 
State Bar Association is declared by the Legislature to be an ‘agency of the state,’ this does not mean 
all laws referring to ‘state agencies’ are applicable to it.”  Id. (citing Graham v. Wash. State Bar 
Ass’n, 86 Wash. 2d 624, 548 P.2d 310 (1976)). 
 61. 1991 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. No. 5. 
 62. Id.  The attorney general took the four-factor functional-equivalency test from Board of 
Trustees v. Freedom of Information Comm’n, 436 A.2d 266 (Conn. 1980), in which a school, estab-
lished by special corporate charter, was found to be a state agency for purposes of public disclosure 
laws.  Id.  The Connecticut Supreme Court based its four-part test upon the “major and discrete” 
criteria employed by the federal courts in Freedom of Information Act cases involving the definition 
of “agency.”  Id.  Washington courts continue to use the exact language in the test used by Connecti-
cut Court (now referred to in Washington as the Telford Test).  See Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care 
& Control Shelter, 144 Wash. App. 185, 181 P.3d 881 (2008). 
 63. 1991 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. No. 5.  In applying the test, the attorney general determined 
that although the Small Business Export Finance Assistance Center “performed a governmental 
function,” participated in some “government involvement” (because its officers were appointed by 
the governor), and was “created by government,” the legislature kept the state out of the Center’s 
operation “to a degree sufficient to render . . . the public records provisions of the Public Disclosure 
Act inapplicable.”  Id. 
 64. Telford, 95 Wash. App. 149, 974 P.2d 886 (1999), review denied, 138 Wash. 2d 1015, 989 
P.2d 1143 (1999).  For a detailed analysis of this case, see Leslie L. Marshall, Note, Telford: Casting 
Sunlight on Shadow Governments—Limits to the Delegation of Government Power to Associations 
of Officials and Agencies, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 139 (2000).  Beyond the establishment of a court-
approved “functional equivalency” test, the significance of this case centered upon the ability of 
governmental agencies to form “private organizations” that would enable the governmental agencies 
to circumvent laws and engage in otherwise prohibited activities.  See Telford, 95 Wash App. at 149, 
974 P.2d at 886. 
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money on state ballot measures, contributed to political campaigns, and 
refused to disclose information about these activities,65 all illegal acts 
under the PDA.66  The Washington Court of Appeals, Division II, first 
held that the Act was ambiguous as applied to WSAC and WACO be-
cause to fit the statutory definition of agency, WSAC and WACO must 
qualify as “other local public agenc[ies], which are not defined.”67  The 
court then determined that the attorney general’s functional-equivalency 
analysis was the correct test to determine whether WSAC and WACO 
were agencies under the Act.68  This test is now referred to in Washing-
ton courts as the Telford test.69  After balancing the facts upon its appli-
cation of the four-factor test, the court determined that these private, non-
profit corporations were agencies subject to the PDA.70  In so doing, the 
court emphasized the importance of the PDA’s purpose,71 rejecting the 
Attorney General’s Office’s view that WSAC was a private corporation 
and not an agency under the PDA.72  Thus, the court significantly ex-
                                                 
 65. Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 151–52, 974 P.2d at 888. 
 66. Id.  The Public Disclosure Act (PDA) under RCW 42.17, in addition to at that time inclu-
sion of public records laws, also included state campaign finance and lobbying regulations.  The 
PRA definition of agency under RCW 42.56.010(1) was taken verbatim from RCW 42.17.020(2), 
and the definition applied uniformly to all sections of the PDA. 
 67. Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 156, 974 P.2d at 891. 
 68. Id. at 156–63, 974 P.2d at 891–94.  Applying rules of statutory construction, the court then 
determined that a case-by-case functional-equivalency test developed by federal courts to determine 
whether entities were subject to the Freedom of Information Act would be consistent with Washing-
ton Law.  Id. at 156–61, 891–93.  The court finally reviewed the Connecticut and Oregon supreme 
courts’ respective functional-equivalency tests and agreed with the state attorney general in Att’y 
General Op.1991, No. 5 that Connecticut’s four-factor test was more relevant within the context of 
the PDA.  Id. at 893–94.. 
 69. See, e.g., Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, 144 Wash. App. 185, 181 
P.3d 881, 884 (2008); Spokane Research & Def. Fund v. West Cent. Cmty. Dev. Ass’n, 133 Wash. 
App. 602, 604, 137 P.3d 120, 121 (2006), review denied, 160 Wash. 2d 1006, 158 P.3d. 614 (2007). 
 70. Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 165, 974 P.2d at 895. 
Although WSAC and WACO retain some characteristics of private entities, their essen-
tial functions and attributes are those of a public agency.  They serve a public purpose, 
are publicly funded, are run by government officials, and were created by government of-
ficials.  Analyzing these factors in the context of the intent of the PDA and other relevant 
statutes reinforces the conclusion that the associations are public. 
Id. 
 71. See id. (“The PDA is to be construed broadly to promote disclosure and accountability.  
The WSAC/WACO statutes are intended to restrict public funding of the associations to statutorily 
mandated services.  Allowing WSAC/WACO to use their public funds to support private political 
agendas would contravene both policies.”). 
 72. Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 96-2-04116-2 at 6 (Wash. Supr. Ct. 
Thurston County, Oct. 29, 1997) (mem.).  Paul Telford had asked the Washington State Attorney 
General to enforce the PDA against the WSAC, but the attorney general’s office informed Mr. Tel-
ford by letter that a “prior AG found WSAC to be a private corporation.”  Id. 
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panded the type of organizations subject to the PDA beyond what the 
attorney general intended.73 
3.  The Limits of “Functional Equivalency” Under the Telford Test 
The question of agency ambiguity as applied to a “private entity”—
calling for Telford’s functional-equivalency test—was not considered 
again in a published Washington court decision until 2006, in Spokane 
Research & Defense Fund v. West Central Community Development As-
sociation.74  Even then, the  balancing test was performed only as dicta.75  
The entity in question was the West Central Community Development 
Association (WCCDA), a private, non-profit corporation that provided 
grant-funded community services to benefit low-to-moderate-income 
residents and leased a community center building located in a public park 
for $1 per year from the City of Spokane.76  The Spokane Research & 
Defense Fund (SRDF) alternatively claimed that the WCCDA was part 
of the Spokane Parks Department or the functional equivalent to a local 
agency, and was thus subject to the PDA either way.77 
The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s summary judgment for 
the WCCDA, first rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that because the 
WCCDA was located in a city park, the WCCDA was part of the city’s 
park department.78  The court next rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that 
the functional-equivalency test in Telford applied to WCCDA because 
the court could find no facts that could make the WCCDA fit within the 
plain language definition of “state agency” or “other local agency” under 
the PDA.79  In other words, the court held that the Telford test applies 
                                                 
 73. See Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 162, 974 P.2d at 893.  Although the court agreed with the 
attorney general’s opinion letter that the four-factor functional-equivalency test from Board of Trus-
tees v. Freedom of Information Comm’n, 436 A.2d 266 (Conn. 1980) was appropriate to determine 
whether non-profit corporations were agencies under Washington’s PDA, the court rejected the 
attorney general’s interpretation about how the Board of Trustees test was to be applied: 
The attorney general opinion cites Board of Trustees, 436 A.2d at 270-71, for the proposition that all 
four factors must be met.  The Board of Trustees case merely states that all of the factors were met in 
that particular case and goes on to note that a case-by-case “application of the factors” is most ap-
propriate.  Id. 
 74. Spokane Research & Def. Fund v. West Cen. Comm. Dev. Ass’n, 133 Wash. App. 602, 
137 P.3d 120 (2006), review denied, 160 Wash. 2d 1006, 158 P.3d. 614 (2007). 
 75. Id. at 606–610, 137 P.3d at 122–23. 
 76. Id. at 604–605, 609, 137 P.3d at 120–21, 123. 
 77. Id. at 606, 137 P.3d at 121–22.  Although this decision occurred after the PRA was re-
codified, the complaint originated when the public records component was still part of the PDA.  Id. 
 78. Id. at 606, 137 P.3d at 121.  The court held that the SRDF “did not provide reasoned argu-
ment connecting the Spokane Parks and Recreation Department and the [WCCDA].”  Id.  The court 
then noted that tenants located in publicly owned structures on public land, such as tenants of muni-
cipally owned industrial parks, do not automatically become public agencies.  Id. 
 79. Id. at 608, 137 P.3d at 122 (“Said differently, the facts summarized below create no ambi-
guity as to the [WCCDA’s] non-governmental status.  The facts do not raise the PDA law.  There-
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only if there is some ambiguity about whether a private entity is an agen-
cy under the Act.80 
The court of appeals then proceeded to apply the Telford analysis 
“solely for argument” and arrived at the same result as its holding.81  The 
court determined that the WCCDA met none of the four balancing Tel-
ford factors that would make it functionally equivalent to a local agency 
and subject to the PDA: (1) Entity’s function: WCCDA’s function (pro-
viding social programs and serving public interests) is “not the exclusive 
domain of the government . . . that may be ‘delegated to the private sec-
tor’”;82 (2) Amount of government funding: the WCCDA receives about 
25% of its funds from private sources;83 (3) Amount of government con-
trol: there is no visible outside government control of the WCCDA;84 (4) 
Entity’s origin: although the city was involved in developing the com-
munity center, it was the city’s intent from the beginning for WCCDA to 
independently administer the community center’s programs.85 
4.  A Private Business as a Local Agency: the Telford Test in Clarke 
In light of the restrictive reading of the Telford functional equiva-
lency-test in Spokane Research & Defense Fund, it appeared that the 
court of appeals had set a very high bar to establish that a private, non-
governmentally run organization is an agency subject to the PDA/PRA.  
                                                                                                             
fore, we need not apply Telford’s functional equivalent analysis.”).  The court then proceeded to 
distinguish the WCCDA as a private entity from WSAC and WACO in Telford: 
Unlike the Telford entities, the [WCCDA] was not created to fulfill a legislative mandate 
. . . does not make policy or legislate . . . does not execute law or regulate law . . . does 
not adjudicate disputes . . . is not controlled by elected or appointed county officials, is 
not government audited, and its employees are not paid by a government or enjoy gov-
ernment health or retirement benefits.  In short, the [WCCDA] possesses no material go-
vernmental attributes or characteristics.  The [WCCDA] simply rents space from the City, 
administers public and private grants, subleases space for its own benefit, and operates 
apart from governmental control. 
Id. at 608, 137 P.3d at 123. 
 80. See id. at 608, 137 P.3d at 122. 
 81. Id. at 608, 137 P.3d at 123. 
 82. Id. at 609, 137 P.3d at 123 (quoting Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 164, 974 P.2d at 894). 
 83. Spokane Research, 133 Wash. App. at 602, 137 P.3d at 123.  Also, in downplaying City 
financial contributions, the Court noted: 
[The WCCDA] subleases space, using the income for operational purposes.  The nominal 
lease payment to the City is merely part of the contract consideration.  [The WCCDA] 
administers programs as an independent contractor, relieving the City of dealing with po-
tential faith based programs barred to the City under separation of church and state prin-
ciples.  Government grant receipt does not mandate FOIA application. 
Id. 
 84. Id. at 609, 137 P.3d at 123 (“The City is not involved in the day-to-day [WCCDA] opera-
tions.  Further, when the City contracts with the [WCCDA], it typically includes an independent 
contractor clause . . . .”). 
 85. Id. at 609–10, 137 P.3d at 123. 
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However, that same court of appeals, Division III, held two years later in 
Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter that a for-profit 
business contracting to carry out governmental services can be consi-
dered an “agency” under the Act.86 
The Animal Control Authority (ACA) of Richland, Pasco, and 
Kennewick (the Tri-Cities) contracted with a private business, Tri-Cities 
Animal Care & Control Center (TCAC), to provide animal control ser-
vices for the Tri-Cities area.87  The plaintiff, Ms. Clarke, believed that 
TCAC was violating euthanasia protocol and made a records request for 
all euthanasia logbooks maintained by TCAC.88  TCAC responded that it 
was not a public agency under the PDA and directed Ms. Clarke to re-
quest records from the ACA.89  After the City of Kennewick responded 
that it did not possess the records, Ms. Clarke filed suit, and the trial 
court held both that TCAC was not a public agency as defined by the 
PDA and that TCAC did not engage in the type of agency activity 
present in Telford.90 
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, first holding 
that, unlike the WCCDA in Spokane Research & Defense Fund, there 
was ambiguity about TCAC’s status as an “other local public agency,” 
and thus, the Telford analysis did apply.91  The court then determined 
that TCAC, on balance, was functionally equivalent to an “other local 
agency” and subject to the PDA:92 (1) Entity’s function: TCAC under-
took police power functions established by statute, these powers impli-
cated state actor due process concerns, and thus, local governments could 
not delegate away their responsibilities under the PDA93; (2) Amount of 
                                                 
 86. See Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, 144 Wash. App. 185, 181 P.3d 
881 (2008). 
 87. Id. at 189–90, 181, P.3d at 883. 
 88. Id. at 190, 181 P.3d at 883. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 190, 181 P.3d at 883–84. 
 91. Id. at 192, 181 P.3d at 884.  TCAC argued “that since the legislature used the term ‘private 
corporation’ in the definition of person, it would have used the term in the definition of ‘agency’ as 
well if it intended to include private corporations as agencies.”  Id.  The court rejected this argument 
as non-responsive to the fundamental question at hand because “[t]his argument still does not ex-
plain what precisely constitutes an ‘other local public agency,’ which is essentially the question 
Telford sought to answer . . . .”  Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 192–194, 181 P.3d at 885–86.  The court rejected Telford’s analysis that hinged on 
whether the entity’s duties could be delegated to the private sector: 
In short, while the local government can delegate the performance authority for this pub-
lic function to a private entity, it cannot delegate away its statutory responsibility to per-
form within PDA legal requirements. . . .  Said another way, were we to conclude that 
TCAC is not a functional equivalent of a public agency, we would be setting a precedent 
that would allow governmental agencies to contravene the intent of the PDA and the Pub-
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government funding: nearly all of TCAC’s operating budget came from 
public money, and TCAC operated in office space that not only was rent-
free (subsidized by government), but TCAC was prohibited from using 
the facility for anything other than its contracted animal control servic-
es94; (3) Amount of government control: Although TCAC was in control 
of its day-to-day operations, maintained its own insurance, and its em-
ployees were not considered public employees with local government 
benefits, TCAC was subject to a “notable degree of government con-
trol.”95  Factors implying “government control” included restrictions on 
how TCAC could use its government-provided facilities; TCAC could 
provide euthanasia services only in a manner approved by the ACA, and 
TCAC was required to keep records and submit monthly reports to the 
ACA;96 (4) Entity’s origin: the court weighed this factor in favor of 
TCAC because TCAC was formed as a private corporation by private 
citizens and was thus not an entity created by government.97  The court 
found that although TCAC had some non-public functions and characte-
ristics, on balance, TCAC was the functional equivalent of a public 
agency.98 
IV.  TELFORD AND THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED 
TO PRIVATE CONTRACTORS 
The Clarke court and the Spokane Research court (in dicta) were 
wrong to apply the Telford functional-equivalency test to determine 
whether private organizations that provided government services were 
agencies under the PRA.  Those who would differ with this assertion 
might reasonably ask how one would know whether these organizations 
are agencies without performing some kind of test, like Telford.99  Skep-
tics might also point out that the result in Clarke appears to support the 
Act’s integrity and purpose: TCAC exercised governmental powers that 
affected citizens’ constitutional rights;100 the ACA’s privatization of its 
                                                                                                             
lic Records Act by contracting with private entities to perform core government func-
tions. 
Id. at 194, 181 P.3d at 885–86. 
 94. Id. at 194–195, 181 P.3d at 886. 
 95. Id. at 195, 181 P.3d at 886. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. The Clarke court made this point when it rejected TCAC’s assertion that the legislature 
never intended private corporations to be considered “other local public agenc[ies].”  See id. at 192, 
181 P.3d at 884. 
 100. See id. at 193, 181 P.3d at 885.  The local government granted TCAC the ability to ex-
ecute police powers that “implicate due process concerns” and that require animal control officers to 
comply with the same constitutional and statutory restrictions imposed on law enforcement officers.  
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core governmental functions allowed the ACA to avoid its responsibili-
ties under the PRA;101 the court had no other apparent means to require 
the release of the requested records;102 and the decision can be narrowly 
construed to cover rare instances where government agencies have con-
tracted out nearly all of their responsibilities.103  This part, however, ex-
plains (1) why the Clarke court badly misinterpreted the statute and prior 
case law when arriving at its agency definition, and (2) how Clarke’s 
precedent damages the PRA’s ultimate purpose of better and more ac-
countable government by restricting the elected officials’ options. 
The Clarke court was wrong to apply the Telford functional-
equivalency test for several reasons: (1) private organizations are not 
agencies under Washington courts’ correct application of the rules for 
statutory construction; (2) Telford was meant to apply to governmental 
entities masquerading as “private organizations,” not to actual privately 
controlled and operated organizations performing services under gov-
ernment contracts; (3) Telford is superfluous because a correct applica-
tion will necessarily produce the result that private contractors are not 
agencies; (4) Telford, as applied in Clarke, is arbitrary and does not get 
behind the true purpose of the PRA; and (5) Telford, as applied in 
Clarke, produces an unreasonably burdensome and ultimately undemo-
cratic result. 
A.  Private Organizations Are Not “Agencies” Under the Washington 
Public Records Act 
The Public Records Act defines agency not by what it is (i.e. an of-
fice exercising governmental authority vested to it by the Washington 
State Constitution), but instead, by the types of agencies it includes (i.e. 
                                                                                                             
Id.  More simply stated, TCAC could, under “police powers,” take one’s most precious possession, 
one’s pet, and kill it.  See id. 
 101. Id. at 194, 181 P.3d at 885–86.  The court distinguished between government’s delegation 
of authority to a private entity, which it can do, from its delegation of statutory responsibility to 
perform within PDA legal requirements, which it cannot do.  Id.  A contrary decision would see-
mingly enable public agencies to escape the public accountability (and associated costs) that the 
PRA was designed to ensure. 
 102. See id. at 190, 181 P.3d at 883.  The court noted that the ACA would have been required 
to produce the records, even if the records were no longer in the ACA’s possession, if the ACA had 
used these records, but it was not clear from the trial court record whether the ACA had used the 
logbooks in question.  Id. 
 103. See id. at 192, 181 P.3d at 884.  By accepting Spokane Research’s holding that there was 
“no ambiguity as to the Association’s nongovernmental status” without even analyzing that court’s 
application of Telford, Clarke’s holding with regard to TCAC appears narrowly construed to situa-
tions where private organizations execute police powers or where government agencies have entirely 
delegated away their statutory responsibilities.  Id. 
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“State Agency,” or “Local Agency”).104  This checklist approach makes 
it easier for citizens and courts to recognize the broad assortment of go-
vernmental entities that are covered by the PRA.105  While the qualifica-
tion of “agency” by the word “other” has the positive benefit of not 
creating a bright line that government agencies can finagle their way 
around,106 this definition removes any legislative boundary that such a 
bright line provides.  Also, defining “agency” as any “other local or state 
agency” is circular and subject to the judiciary’s discretion.  Just what is 
an agency?—whatever a court proclaims one to be. 
Application of Washington’s accepted rules of statutory construc-
tion quickly reveals that the legislature had no intention to subject private 
corporations to the Public Records Act.  Under the first consideration of 
statutory construction, courts determine whether the statute is unambi-
guous,107 and courts have reasonably held that these “other agency” defi-
nitions are ambiguous with respect to certain private corporations.108  
However, when the statute is ambiguous, courts must first give a term its 
plain and ordinary meaning by reference to a standard dictionary.109  The 
plain and ordinary meaning of agency is a “governmental body with the 
authority to implement and administer particular legislation.”110  Even in 
rare situations, like Clarke, where private entities have the authority to 
                                                 
 104. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(1) (2008).  Thus, “‘Agency’ includes all state agencies 
and all local agencies. . . . ‘State Agency’ includes every state office, department, division, . . . or 
other state agency. . . . ‘Local Agency’ includes every city, town, municipal corporation . . . or other 
local public agency.”  Id. 
 105. For example, as of January, 2009, Washington had 1,646 special purpose districts, which 
include the following categories: county airport districts, park and recreation service areas, public 
transportation authorities, county rail districts, cultural arts, stadium, and convention districts, drai-
nage, diking, or sewerage improvement districts, emergency medical service districts, emergency 
service communication districts, flood control districts, flood control zone districts, health districts, 
intercounty weed districts, library capital facility areas, bridge and road service district, solid waste 
disposal districts, television reception improvement districts, transportation benefit districts, unin-
corporated transportation benefit areas, and weed control districts.  Municipal Research and Services 
Center of Washington, Number and Types of Special Districts in Washington, 
http://www.mrsc.org/Subjects/Governance/spd/SPD-Number.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).  The 
PRA definition of “Agency” includes “special purpose districts,” making it clear to citizens that 
these less prominent government bodies are also covered by the Act.  See WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 42.56.010(1) (2008). 
 106. See, e.g., Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm’rs, 95 Wash. App. 149, 974 P.2d 886 
(1999), review denied, 138 Wash. 2d 1015, 989 P.2d 1143 (1999). 
 107. Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of 
Eagles, 148 Wash. 2d 224, 59 P.3d 655, 663 (2002) (“In interpreting a statute, the primary objective 
of the court is to ascertain and carry out the intent and purpose of the Legislature in creating it.  To 
determine legislative intent, this court looks first to the language of the statute.”). 
 108. See, e.g., Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 158, 974 P.2d at 891. 
 109. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wash. 2d at 239, 59 P.3d at 663. 
 110. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 67 (8th ed. 2004). 
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“administer particular legislation,”111 private entities are not governmen-
tal bodies,112 and thus do not fall under the plain language definition of 
agency.113 
Next, single words in a statute must be interpreted within the con-
text of surrounding words,114 and no other word under the PRA’s defini-
tion of agency supports the inclusion of private entities under “other 
agency.”  All of the specific types of agencies listed under “State agen-
cy” are governmental agencies, not private corporations.115  Thus, to be 
consistent with the preceding wording, “other state agency” should in-
clude only state governmental agencies that are not a “state office, de-
partment, division, bureau, board, [or] commission . . . .”116  Similarly, 
none of the listed “local agencies” include private organizations,117 and 
thus, no inference should be made to allow “other local public agency” to 
include private organizations. 
                                                 
 111. See Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, 144 Wash. App. 185, 189–90, 
181 P.3d 881, 883 (2008) (TCAC administer[ed] particular legislation in this case: animal control 
laws.). 
 112. “Government” is defined as follows: 
1. The structure of principles and rules determining how a state or government is regu-
lated.  2. The sovereign power in a nation or state.  3. An organization through which a 
body of people exercise political authority; the machinery by which sovereign power is 
expressed <the Canadian government>.  In this sense, the term refers collectively to the 
political organs of a country regardless of their function or level, and regardless of the 
subject matter they deal with. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY  715–16 (8th ed. 2004).  The first two definitions are abstract concep-
tions of government that do not apply to organizations.  Under the third definition, even if a private 
organization can be considered part of the “machinery by which sovereign power is expressed,” a 
private organization cannot be considered a “political organ.”  A private organization answers to and 
is controlled by its owners, not an elected political body. 
 113. As previously discussed, the Spokane Research court rejected out-of-hand any notion that 
the definition of “other local public agency” was in any way ambiguous with regard to the WCCDA 
because that association “possesse[d] no material governmental attributes or characteristics.”  Spo-
kane Research & Def. Fund v. West Cent. Cmty. Dev. Ass’n, 133 Wash. App. 602, 608, 137 P.3d 
120, 122–23 (2006), review denied, 160 Wash. App. 1006, 158 P.3d. 614 (2007). 
 114. See State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wash. App. 614, 634, 106 P.3d 196, 205 (2005) (“a single 
word in a statute should not be read in isolation and that ‘the meaning of words may be indicated or 
controlled by those with which they are associated.’” (quoting State v. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d 712, 
729, 976 P.2d 1229 (1999))). 
 115. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(1) (2008) (“‘State agency’ includes every state office, 
department, division, bureau, board, [or] commission . . . .”). 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. (“‘Local agency’ includes every county, city, town, municipal corporation, quasi-
municipal corporation, or special purpose district, or any office, department, division, bureau, board, 
commission, or agency thereof . . .”).  Even Clarke did not attempt to reason that TCAC was a “divi-
sion” of the ACA, but instead considered TCAC solely as an “other local public agency.”  Clarke v. 
Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, 144 Wash. App. 185, 191, 181 P.3d 881, 884 (2008). 
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Finally, courts must also interpret statutory language in harmony 
with similar provisions in the same statute,118 and when one reads the 
PRA as a whole with its companion statute, the Public Disclosure Act 
(PDA),119 a private corporation is inconsistent with the definitions of 
agency.  The PDA’s definition of “person” includes both “private corpo-
ration” and, separately, “state, or local governmental entity or agency 
however constituted.”120  Because the legislature felt it necessary to sepa-
rately list “private corporation” as distinct from “state or local govern-
mental entity or agency,” it is clear that the legislature did not mean to 
include private corporations under the definition of agency. 
B. The Functional-Equivalency Test Applied in Telford Was Not Meant 
to Apply to Private Contractors 
The Telford functional-equivalency test was meant to apply to go-
vernmental entities masquerading as private organizations, not to private-
ly controlled and operated organizations performing services under gov-
ernment contracts.  In Telford, the Washington State Association of 
Counties (WSAC) and the Washington Association of County Officials 
(WACO) were required by state law to coordinate statewide county ad-
ministrative programs, and counties were required to use WSAC and 
WACO to fulfill certain county statutory duties.121  The real question for 
the court was whether WSAC and WACO could negate their PDA re-
sponsibilities as government-recognized and -funded public agencies 
controlled by local government officials by incorporating as non-profit 
corporations and carrying out other nominal, non-statutorily related func-
tions.122  The Telford court applied the functional-equivalency test sug-
gested by the Washington Attorney General opinion letter because that 
opinion considered whether a similarly constructed entity, the Small 
Business Export Finance Assistance Center (EAC), was an agency sub-
                                                 
 118. See Roggenkamp, 153 Wash. 2d at 634, 106 P.3d at 205 (2005) (“Statutes must be inter-
preted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaning-
less or superfluous.” (quoting State v. J.P., 149 Wash. 2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003))). 
 119. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.  Prior to 2006, the Public Records Act was part of the broader 
Public Disclosure Act.  Although the PRA was split from the PDA, its definitional language (and 
most of the Act’s other language) remained unchanged. 
 120. Id. § 42.17.020(36) (“‘Person’ includes an individual, partnership, joint venture, public or 
private corporation, association, federal, state, or local governmental entity or agency however con-
stituted, candidate, committee, political committee, political party, executive committee thereof, or 
any other organization or group of persons, however organized.”). 
 121. See Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm’rs, 95 Wash. App. 149, 159–60, 974 P.2d 
886, 892–93 (1999), review denied, 138 Wash. 2d 1015, 989 P.2d 1143 (1999). 
 122. See id. at 165–66, 974 P.2d at 895. 
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ject to the PDA.123  Thus, the Telford court considered whether govern-
mental bodies can organize themselves in forms (as private corporations) 
that are exempt from public disclosure laws. 
While the Telford court reviewed a question of semantic trickery, 
the Spokane Research and Clarke courts considered a very different and 
more substantive issue: whether governmental bodies can contract their 
responsibilities to independent private entities.124  In Spokane Research, 
the court recognized the fundamental difference between “quasi-
governmental” agencies like WSAC/WACO and private contracting or-
ganizations like the West Central Community Development Association 
(but wrongly performed the Telford test anyway in dicta).125  The Clarke 
court ignored Spokane Research’s understanding of these differences, 
and in its application of Telford, proceeded to treat TCAC as if it were a 
quasi-governmental body.126  Thus, the Clarke court inappropriately 
transformed Telford’s original question—whether government agencies 
were pretending to be private in order to get around the PRA—into a 
completely different question—whether private contractors perform 
enough of a government function to be considered a “public agency” un-
der the PRA.127  The Clarke court should never have applied the Telford 
test. 
                                                 
 123. See id. at 161, 974 P.2d at 893.  Although the Small Business Export Finance Assistance 
Center was established by state law and was “governed and managed” by seventeen directors ap-
pointed by the governor and confirmed by the senate, the attorney general opined that the EAC was 
not an agency under the PDA.  1991 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. No. 5. 
 124. See Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, 144 Wash. Ap. 185, 181 P.3d 
881 (2008); Spokane Research & Def. Fund v. West Cent. Cmty. Dev. Ass’n, 133 Wash. App. 602, 
137 P.3d 120 (2006), review denied, 160 Wash. 2d 1006, 158 P.3d. 614 (2007). 
 125. See Spokane Research, 133 Wash. App. at 608, 137 P.3d at 122–23. 
The facts as summarized below create no ambiguity as to [WCCDA]’s non-governmental 
status. . . . Therefore, we need not apply Telford’s functional equivalency analysis.  The 
[WCCDA] is incorporated as a conventional Internal Revenue Code 503(c)(3) charity. . . 
. [WCCDA] does not make policy or legislate.  [WCCDA] does not adjudicate disputes.  
[WCCDA] is not controlled by elected or appointed county officials, is not government 
audited, and its employees are not paid by a government or enjoy government health or 
retirement benefits.  In short, [WCCDA] possesses no material governmental attributes or 
characteristics. 
Id.  By applying Telford “solely for argument,” the court appears to use the test to quash the notion 
that private contractors can fall under the PDA as “other agencies.”  See id. at 609–10, 137 P.3d at 
123. 
 126. See Clarke, 144 Wash. App. at 193, 181 P.3d at 885.  Although the court recognized the 
Spokane Research’s holding, the court failed to distinguish how TCAC was different from WCCDA 
or why the definition of “other local agency” was ambiguous with respect to TCAC and not to 
WCCDA.  See id. 
 127. See id. 
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C.  Private Contractors Are Not Agencies When Correctly Applying Tel-
ford’s Functional Analysis 
When properly applied, Telford’s functional analysis will necessari-
ly produce the result that private contractors are not the functional equi-
valents of agencies.  Thus, the Clarke court was not only wrong to apply 
Telford to TCAC, but the court also bungled its application of the test. 
Telford’s first factor is “whether the entity performs a governmental 
function,”128 and the principal consideration is whether those “duties 
could be delegated to the private sector.”129  Basic logic dictates that pri-
vate contractors cannot perform duties that “cannot be delegated to the 
private sector.”  Thus, it should be impossible for a court to find other-
wise (unless, as in rare situations like Telford, the entity is “private” in 
name only but owned and managed by government agencies and offi-
cials).130 
The Clarke court arrived at a contrary, and incorrect, conclusion 
when it found that TCAC performed a “governmental function.”131  
When considering whether TCAC’s animal-control function could be 
delegated to the private sector, the court determined that although the 
ACA could “delegate the performance authority for this public function 
to a private entity, it cannot delegate away its statutory responsibility to 
perform with PDA legal requirements.”132  This analysis is wrong for two 
reasons.  First, state law clearly allows the animal-control function to be 
delegated to the private sector.133  This should thus settle the issue that 
TCAC is not performing a “governmental function” under Telford.  
Second, the statutory language of the PDA mentions nothing about dele-
gating PDA authority to private entities—the court simply made up this 
requirement.  Finally, if the contract between the ACA and TCAC vi-
olated the PDA, the contractual remedy is for the court to void the con-
tract, not for TCAC to assume the ACA’s statutory PDA duties. 
Telford’s second factor is “the level of government funding,”134 and 
the Telford court distinguished between county membership dues, which 
it found to be “government funding,”135 and government payments for 
                                                 
 128. Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm’rs, 95 Wash. App. 149, 162, 974 P.2d 886, 893 
(1999), review denied, 138 Wash. 2d 1015, 989 P.2d 1143 (1999). 
 129. See id. at 163–64, 974 P.2d at 894. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, 144 Wash. App. 185, 194, 181 
P.3d 881, 885–86 (2008). 
 132. Id. at 194, 181 P.3d at 885. 
 133. See id. (citing several chapters in WASH. REV. CODE § 16.52). 
 134. Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 162, 974 P.2d at 893. 
 135. See id. at 164, 974 P.2d at 894–95 (finding that membership dues were for 
WSAC/WACO’s general operations, which included activities the court already held to be “govern-
ment functions”).  This was important because WSAC could not identify payments from these dues 
762 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:3 
specific goods or services, which fell outside “government funding.”136  
In Washington, private contractors must provide specific goods and ser-
vices in return for government money received;137 these contracts are 
subject to a myriad of state laws.138  Private contractors would never 
have the ability to pool and allocate blocks of government funds at their 
discretion that would constitute “government funding” under Telford.139 
By contrast, the Clarke court ignored Telford’s determination of 
what constitutes “government funding.”140  The Clarke court wrongly 
asserted that because almost all of TCAC’s operating budget came from 
public money, this factor weighed in favor of TCAC falling under the 
PDA (ignoring the fact that these were contractual payments for animal 
control services rendered and were not membership dues or other gov-
ernment payments that could be used at TCAC’s discretion).141  Under 
Clarke’s precedent, the “government funding” factor now weighs against 
any business whose primary revenue comes through government work. 
Telford’s third factor is “the extent of government involvement or 
regulation,”142 or in other words, “government control,”143 and the prin-
cipal disqualifying consideration is whether there is “private sector in-
volvement or membership.”144  This factor gets to the heart of the “shell-
game” problem where government officials form a private corporation 
that those officials control and with whom they contract to escape regula-
tions that would otherwise affect their operations.  Unless private con-
                                                                                                             
as being directed toward specific goods and services provided to the counties that may have been 
outside the scope of “government functions.”  See id. 
 136. See id. Government payments for specific goods and services performed at arm’s length 
are not considered “government funding” as long as these payments are not disbursed en masse to be 
spent at the discretion of the contracting body.  See id. 
 137. See WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 7 (“No county, city, town or other municipal corporation 
shall hereafter give any money, or property, or loan its money, or credit to or in aid of any individu-
al, association, company or corporation . . . .”). 
 138. See generally, WASH. REV. CODE § 39 (2008), for Washington laws regarding contracting 
and purchasing.  Other RCW titles cover the contracting and purchase of specific types of goods and 
services.  For example, sections 16.52.015–.025 of the Revised Code of Washington authorize pri-
vate corporations to organize as humane societies and municipalities to enter into contracts with 
these corporations to enforce animal-control laws. 
 139. See Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 162, 974 P.2d at 893. 
 140. See Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, 144 Wash. App. 185, 194–95, 
181 P.3d 881, 886 (2008). 
 141. See id. 
 142. Telford, 144 Wash. App. at 162, 974 P.2d at 893. 
 143. Id. at 165, 974 P.2d at 895. 
 144. See id. (holding that WSAC/WACO were under “government control” because they were 
“completely controlled by elected and appointed county officials . . . [and there was] no private 
sector involvement or membership.”). 
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tractors are managed by government employees or officials,145 they can-
not be under government control with respect to the PRA.146 
When the Clarke court held that TCAC was under “government 
control”, it simply ignored Telford’s interpretation of “government con-
trol.”147  The court conceded that TCAC was in control of its day-to-day 
operations, that it maintained its own insurance, and that TCAC’s em-
ployees were not considered public employees.148  However, the court 
held TCAC to be under government control because TCAC was re-
stricted in its use of government facilities, TCAC was “only permitted to 
provide euthanasia services in a manner approved by the ACA,” and 
TCAC was “required to keep records and submit monthly reports to the 
ACA.”149  The Clarke court completely failed to appreciate the differ-
ence between actual day-to-day operational control by government offi-
cials (as the Telford court considered), and compliance with the terms of 
contracts and regulations.  Using the court’s rationale, any highly regu-
lated business that is required to provide services and maintain records 
according to government laws and rules would be under government 
control. 
Telford’s final factor is “whether the entity was created by govern-
ment,”150 and the principal disqualifying consideration is whether the 
entity is created by private citizens.151  Private contractors, almost by de-
finition, are created by private citizens, not by government officials, and 
thus Telford’s fourth factor will almost never be satisfied with respect to 
private contractors.152 
The Clarke court grudgingly admitted that “TCAC was formed as a 
private corporation, by private citizens, and was not an entity created by 
                                                 
 145. The Spokane Research court determined that “government control” meant day-to-day 
involvement by the government body over the contracting entity’s operations.  Spokane Research & 
Def. Fund v. West Cent. Cmty. Dev. Ass’n, 133 Wash. App. 602, 609, 137 P.3d 120, 123 (2006), 
review denied, 160 Wash. 2d 1006, 158 P.3d. 614 (2007). 
 146. See Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 165, 974 P.2d at 895. 
 147. See Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, 144 Wash. App. 185, 195, 181 
P.3d 881, 886 (2008). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 162, 974 P.2d at 893. 
 151. See id. at 164, 974 P.2d at 894–95.  The court rejected WSAC/WACO’s assertions that 
they were “created by private citizens interested in the efficient functioning of county government” 
because “they were formed by county officials acting in their official capacities in the furtherance of 
county business . . . [and] the associations were then recognized by the Legislature as coordinating 
agencies to carry out state policy.” Id. 
 152. Theoretically, a government official may set up a private business and contract with the 
public agency he works for, although such self-dealing is, in most instances, banned by government 
ethics codes and regulations.  No such allegation was made regarding TCAC.  See Clarke, 144 
Wash. App. at 195, 181 P.3d at 886. 
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government.”153  The court stated: “Although it could not perform its 
function without its relationship to the local government, this factor 
weighs against PDA application.”154 
The Clarke court held that “on balance,” TCAC was functionally 
equivalent to an agency, 155 but there was nothing for the court to bal-
ance: all four Telford factors weighed heavily against functional equiva-
lency for TCAC because, with proper Telford application, no private, 
independent company can be equivalent.  Thus, the danger of applying 
Telford’s four-factor functional-equivalency balancing test to private 
contractors is not the use of this test itself, unless the contractor is a gov-
ernment agency masquerading as a private contractor.  The real danger is 
that courts, like Clarke, will creatively misapply Telford to construct a 
body of case law that pulls even more public contractors within the 
PRA’s jurisdiction. 
D.  The Result of Telford, As Applied to Private Contractors, Can Be 
Arbitrary and Does Not Get Behind the True Purpose of the Public 
Records Act 
Under Washington courts’ application of the Telford functional-
equivalency test, some private contractors are subject to the Public 
Records Act, and some are not.156  The decision in Clarke implied that 
the central distinction between TCAC and the WCCDA in Spokane Re-
search was TCAC’s assumption of police powers.157  However, this dis-
tinction ignores the PRA’s central purpose: to make government transpa-
rent so that citizens “[remain] informed so that they may maintain con-
trol over the instruments that they have created.”158  Citizens may want to 
                                                 
 153. See id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See, e.g., Clarke, 144 Wash. App. at 155, 181 P.3d at 881 (holding that TCAC was subject 
to the PRA); Spokane Research, 133 Wash. App. at 602, 137 P.3d at 120 (holding that WCCDA was 
not subject to the PRA). 
 157. See Clarke, 144 Wash. App. at 193–94, 181 P.3d at 885.  In Clarke, the court made no 
direct Telford comparison between TCAC and Spokane Research and did not distinguish why it held 
that the definition of “other public agency” was ambiguous with regard to TCAC while accepting 
Spokane Research’s holding that there was no definitional ambiguity with respect to WCCDA.  See 
id. at 884.  However, the main part of Clarke’s Telford discussion focused on TCAC’s enforcement 
powers, a contractual duty that WCCDA never performed.  See id. at 193, 181 P.3d at 885. 
 158. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.040 (2008). See also Progressive Animal Welfare Soc. v. Univ. 
of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 251, 884 P.2d 592, 597 (1994). 
The stated purpose of the Public Records Act is nothing less than the preservation of the 
most central tenets of representative government, namely, the sovereignty of the people 
and the accountability to the people of public officials and institutions. . . . Without tools 
such as the Public Records Act, government of the people, by the people, for the people, 
risks becoming government of the people, by the bureaucrats, for the special interests. 
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maintain control over government institutions for different reasons, 
whether for lawmaking,159 the exercise of police power,160 or the expend-
iture of public funds.161 
By focusing on an “other agency’s” form rather than impact (or by 
a court selecting which “impact” will qualify a contractor as an “other 
agency”), Telford’s functional-equivalency test arbitrarily ignores the 
purpose of the PRA.  Why should the PRA not apply to Spokane Re-
search’s WCCDA but instead to Clarke’s TCAC when WCCDA has 
more discretion on how it uses government funds,162 controls and ex-
pends more government resources,163 and impacts a larger, more diverse 
community?164  The consequence of courts applying Telford is that citi-
zens of the Tri-Cities can monitor their private animal-control provider 
by requesting and receiving records, but citizens of Spokane’s West Cen-
tral Community cannot do the same with their community center.  For 
consistency’s sake, it would make more sense to follow other states’ pub-
lic access laws that either limit requests to recognized government agen-
cies or subject all recipients of government funds to disclosure.165 
                                                                                                             
Id. 
 159. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.010 (2008).  The Legislative Declaration for the Open 
Public Meetings Act includes the same language as the Public Records Act construction section.  See 
Id. 
 160. See, e.g., Clarke, 144 Wash. App. at 155, 181 P.3d at 881. 
 161. See Yakima Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Yakima, 77 Wash. App. 319, 328, 890 P.2d 544, 
549 (1995) (“Certainly, there exists a reasonable concern by the public that government conduct 
itself fairly and use public funds responsibly.”). 
 162. See Spokane Research & Def. Fund v. West Cent. Cmty. Dev. Ass’n, 133 Wash. App. 
602, 604, 137 P.3d 120, 123 (2006), review denied, 160 Wash. 2d 1006, 158 P.3d. 614 (2007).  In 
addition to receiving 75% of its funding from public sources, the WCCDA rented its facility from 
the city for one dollar per year and was allowed to sublease the facility to other organizations at a 
higher rent and then keep the profits for its own programs.  Id.  Thus, WCCDA had the discretion to 
use these “public funds” to provide community services including the Woman, Infant, and Children 
Nutrition Program, Head Start, Deaconess Women’s Clinic, Learning Skills Center, and before- and 
after-school programs.  Id. at 605, 137 P.3d at 121.  Further, WCCDA was created, in part, to relieve 
the city of dealing with potential faith-based programs barred to the city under separation of church 
and state principles.  Id. at 609, 137 P.3d at 123.  Compare Clarke, 144 Wash. App. at 185, 181 P.3d 
at 881.  Although TCAC, as a for-profit business, was not limited on how it could spend its profits, 
the money received was for specific animal-control activities and no more.  See id. at 193, 181 P.3d 
at 885.  There was no tacit agreement that the profits would be spent for other public services that 
the contracting agency otherwise chose not to or constitutionally could not do.  See id. 
 163. See Spokane Research, 133 Wash. App. at 602, 604–05, 137 P.3d at 121, 123.  The deci-
sion did not disclose the amount of public money received and expended by WCCDA, but one can 
infer that the substance and breadth of the many programs provided were significantly greater than 
TCAC’s animal-control responsibilities.  See id. 
 164. See id. 
 165. For a compendium of all states’ public records laws, including how these laws pertain to 
government contractors, see THE OPEN GOVERNMENT GUIDE (The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of 
the Press ed., 5th ed. 2006). 
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E.  Telford, As Applied in Clarke and Future Cases, May Produce Un-
reasonably Burdensome and Undemocratic Results When Courts Deter-
mine That Private Contractors Are “Agencies” 
If the purpose of the Public Records Act is to produce better gov-
ernment, then subjecting private government contractors to the require-
ments of the Act defeats this very purpose.  Productive and innovative 
private organizations may choose not to pursue government contracts to 
avoid the invasion of privacy, the added work, and the expense required 
to comply with the PRA.  In turn, governments may choose not to con-
tract for services because of the extra costs and fewer willing contracting 
parties, with the result that some services may no longer be provided.  
The consequence may be to deter democratically elected governments 
from working with the private sector to provide more creative, effective, 
and cheaper ways to provide public services. 
For the past thirty years, scholars and politicians have fiercely de-
bated the merits of privatizing government services.166  Privatization is 
accomplished by deliberate delegation of authority, in the form of some 
legal instrument—usually a contract—by a formally constituted entity of 
traditional government.167  Outside of Washington, many state and local 
governments have privatized important government services,168 and crit-
ics have complained that this type of contracting hurts government work-
ers, reduces public oversight, damages affirmative action goals, and often 
costs more than it would for that agency to perform the work itself.169 
Outright privatization in Washington is rare, and most government 
contracting is not controversial.  Governments usually contract with pri-
vate companies or organizations to perform services that support the 
agency’s existing body of work when that agency lacks the expertise, 
efficiency, or resources to best complete the task itself.170  In Washing-
                                                 
 166. See generally Chris Sagers, The Myth of “Privatization,” 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 37 (2007) 
(reviewing the existing “privatization” literature, the author counted over 600 law review or journal 
articles that used the terms “privatize” or “privatization” in their titles). 
 167. Id. at 39. 
 168. See Craig D. Feiser, Protecting the Public’s Right to Know: The Debate over Privatiza-
tion and Access to Government Information Under State Law, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 829 
(2000).  Examples of local privatization include fire protection, transportation, jails, and health care 
facilities.  Id. 
 169. Id. at 832. 
 170. Most government purchasing and public works contracting falls under this category.  For 
example, when faced with constructing a bridge, a municipal transportation department may lack in-
house resources to complete the job itself, contract with a civil engineering firm to design the bridge, 
and contract with a bridge construction firm to build the bridge.  This type of contracting is different 
from the more controversial “complete” outsourcing because contracted work is done under some 
supervision of in-house departmental engineers and project managers, and once the project is com-
plete, the bridge is part of the municipally managed road network. 
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ton, most government grants must also be in the form of contracts to pass 
state constitutional muster.171  Public-private partnership grants are con-
ceptually popular with both progressives and conservatives: progressives 
are happy that additional public services are provided, while conserva-
tives prefer using the private sector to perform this work.172 
The different contracting situations, not the proper application of 
Telford, probably determined the respective PRA holdings in Clarke and 
Spokane Research.  In Clarke, the court criticized the concept of privati-
zation where the municipal animal-control agency could escape its re-
sponsibilities by contracting out almost all of its functions, despite state 
law explicitly allowing the agency to do just that.173  In Spokane Re-
search, the court extended tacit support for Spokane’s public-private 
partnership with WCCDA by minimizing any connection between the 
city’s public support—grants of free rent, on top of other funding—and 
the WCCDA’s use of these resources.174  However, the Telford function-
al-equivalency test makes no distinction between wholesale contracting-
out and contracting by grants, and the Spokane Research court could 
have creatively used Telford to determine that WCCDA was an agency if 
the court, for some reason, disapproved of this contractual arrange-
                                                 
 171. See WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 7 (“No county, city, town or other municipal corporation 
shall hereafter give any money, or property . . . to or in aid of any individual, association, company 
or corporation, except for the necessary support of the poor and infirm . . . .”).  Thus, grants usually 
require consideration (in the form of contracts), although courts will not inquire as to the considera-
tion’s adequacy.  See King County v. Taxpayers of King County, 133 Wash. 2d 584, 597, 949 P.2d 
1260, 1267 (1997). 
 172. For a history of the development of government/private partnerships through grants, see 
Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service: The Twentieth Century Culture of Contracting 
Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 859 (2007).  Guttman points 
out that the impetus for such contracting came not from the conservative right but instead from New 
Deal progressives, and the growth of “grant” contracting was the product of a bipartisan deal to 
maximize the services provided by government without increasing the size of the government work-
force.  Id. at 862. 
 173. See Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, 144 Wash. App. 185, 194, 181 
P.3d 881, 885–86 (2008).  The court stated: 
Said another way, were we to conclude that TCAC is not a functional equivalent of a 
public agency, we would be setting a precedent that would allow governmental agencies 
to contravene the intent of the PDA and the Public Records Act by contracting with pri-
vate entities to perform core government functions. 
Id.  Although the court factored privatization against TCAC under Telford’s “function” step, as 
previously discussed, the court had no legitimate basis to do this.  See id. 
 174. See Spokane Research & Def. Fund v. West Cent. Cmty. Dev. Ass’n, 133 Wash. App. 
602, 608, 137 P.3d 120, 123 (2006), review denied, 160 Wash. 2d 1006, 158 P.3d 614 (2007).  The 
court downplayed WCCDA’s provision of services in return for “grants”: “In short, the [WCCDA] 
simply rents space from the City, administers public and private grants, [and] subleases space for its 
own benefit . . . .”  Id.  The court also uncritically accepted the WCCDA’s status under these con-
tracts as an “independent contractor.”  Id. at 609, 137 P.3d at 123. 
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ment.175  Thus, most contractors that receive substantial public funding 
may fall under the PRA if judges choose to follow Clarke’s example. 
Although the impact of Clarke may not be apparent from the text of 
the decision,176 the potential effect on a contractor found to be an “agen-
cy” is severe because that contractor is subject to the same public records 
laws as government agencies.177  Complying with the PRA will require a 
significant investment of time, training, and resources: the contractor 
must appoint a public records officer,178 maintain an index of all 
records,179 make records available for public review,180 respond to all 
requests within five days,181 and properly exempt records from disclo-
sure.182  Records subject to public scrutiny will include much that private 
organizations normally prefer to keep private, including financial data, 
employee information,183 and in the case of non-profits, private donor 
identities when their gifts are intermingled with public funds.184  Finally, 
contractors will be obligated to fulfill all requests, even those that are 
overwhelming or harassing, because a requestor’s identity and motiva-
                                                 
 175. If the court in Spokane Research had been hostile to the WCCDA’s grant contracting, the 
court could have easily used Telford to conclude that the WCCDA was an “other local public agen-
cy” subject to the PDA: the WCCDA provided social programs that municipalities often offer, the 
WCCDA received most of its funds from the government, it operated from government facilities 
subject to some form of government control, and the WCCDA was originally created and run by a 
city employee acting in his official capacity.  See Spokane Research, 133 Wash. App. at 609–10, 137 
P.3d at 123. 
 176. Ms. Clarke’s request for euthanasia logbooks was targeted and necessary to determine 
whether TCAC was following the euthanasia protocol set out in its contract with the animal-control 
authority.  See Clarke, 144 Wash. App. at 190, 181 P.3d at 883.  The court made no mention of any 
larger consequences than the release of these specific records.  See id. 
 177. Almost all records related to the contractor’s public work would be releasable because 
public records are defined as “any writing containing information relating to the conduct of govern-
ment . . . .”  See  WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(2) (2008).  Further, Washington courts interpret the 
Act “liberally and the exemptions from disclosure narrowly . . . [and] [i]n general, an agency must 
disclose a public record unless a statutory exemption applies.”  Livingston v. Cedeno, 164 Wash. 2d 
46, 50–51, 186 P.3d 1055, 1057 (2008). 
 178. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.580 (2008). 
 179. Id. § 42.56.070. 
 180. Id. §§ 42.56.080–.090. 
 181. Id. § 42.56.520.  Failure to comply may result in penalties, attorney’s fees, and court costs.  
Id. § 42.56.550(4). 
 182. Id. §§ 42.56.050, 210–.480.  Proper exemption often necessitates expert legal advice, 
especially when disclosure might invade privacy and require preventative agency-initiated court 
action under § 42.56.540 of the Revised Code of Washington. 
 183. For example, this may include employee names, birthdates, salaries, and information 
about their dependents, among other things.  See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.250(3) (2008). 
 184. See id. § 42.56.010(2); Livingston v. Cedeno, 164 Wash. 2d 46, 50–51, 186 P.3d 1055, 
1057 (2008). 
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tion under the PRA are irrelevant.185  As hard as it may be for govern-
ment agencies to comply with the PRA, these agencies usually have 
ready access to expert legal advice186 and training.187  Contractors do not 
enjoy access to these same resources, and thus PRA compliance is much 
tougher for them. 
The end result of subjecting private government contractors to the 
PRA is to discourage government contracting overall.  For contractors, 
complying with the PRA will make their services more expensive, and in 
some cases, cause them to entirely forgo public contracts.188  Contractors 
that perform significant amounts of government work may also reorgan-
ize their operations to avoid falling under the PRA.189  Government costs 
will rise and contracting choices will decrease accordingly, causing gov-
ernments to either increase their own headcount by doing the services 
themselves,190 or more likely, choose not to provide that public service at 
all.191  Subjecting contractors to the PRA also complicates grants that 
originate with the state or federal government but are passed through lo-
cal governments for matching and disbursement.192  Thus, designating 
                                                 
 185. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.080 (2008). See also Zink v. City of Mesa, 140 Wash. 
App. 328, 340, 166 P.3d 738, 744 (2007) (holding that there is no limit to the number of requests 
that one can make under the PRA). 
 186. For example, state agencies have ready legal representation through the Washington State 
Attorney General’s Office, and many local agencies are represented by their in-house legal depart-
ments (e.g. city attorney’s office). 
 187. For example, the Association of Washington Cities provides training sessions for its 
member cities.  See Association of Washington Cities (AWC) Home Page, http://www.awcnet.org 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2010). 
 188. Forgoing public contracts may not be an option for some organizations, especially non-
profits, that receive most of their revenue through public funding.  The overhead expense of comply-
ing with the PRA, however, may result in more expensive contract bids or fewer services delivered. 
 189. For example, a company that does most of its work through government contracts may 
choose to separate the government and non-government functions by incorporating into multiple 
companies, thus preventing general corporate records or names of specific donors from being public-
ly accessible. 
 190. Part of the efficiency of contracting is that the agency pays only for services when needed, 
rather than keeping employees and equipment on hand to perform these services as needs arise. 
 191. For example, Washington municipalities may use law enforcement instead of animal 
control agencies to enforce animal control laws.  See WASH. REV. CODE § 16.52.015 (2008).  The 
quality of animal control services would generally be much poorer under such a scenario because 
law enforcement agencies have greater priorities. 
 192. For an example of such “pass-through” or block grant funding, see The City of Seattle 
2009–2012 Consolidated Plan for Housing and Community Development, 
http://www.seattle.gov/humanservices/community_development/conplan/plan/default.htm (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2010).  Under this plan, the City selects recipients and disburses grants to non-profit 
organizations from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, including a 
Community Development Block Grant ($12 million to $13 million per year), HOME Investment 
Partnership (about $5 million annually), Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS (about $1.6 
million annually), and the Emergency Shelter Grant Program (about $540,000 annually).  Id.  Under 
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government contractors as agencies under the PRA harms the public in-
terest by increasing the costs of government and limiting what services 
governments provide. 
Imposing the PRA on government contractors damages democracy 
itself.  By making it harder and expensive for government agencies to 
contract for services they otherwise cannot or are unwilling to do, local 
elected bodies lose the ability to respond to and enact policies that citi-
zens elected them to do.  Also, if the citizens of Richland, Pasco, and 
Kennewick want animal-control services without increasing the size of 
government and state law allows the municipalities to do this, why is a 
judge imposing her own policy choice about what duties an agency may 
delegate through contract?193  By creatively misapplying Telford to im-
pose unnecessary burdens on government contracts, courts are, in effect, 
legislating from the bench and improperly stripping policy-making au-
thority away from Washington’s state and local legislative bodies. 
Dire predictions aside, Clarke’s holding may be an anomaly, and 
courts may rule that only the most extreme cases of privatization will 
subject a contractor to the Public Records Act.  However, two factors 
suggest that courts will apply Clarke’s expansive interpretation of Tel-
ford to other types of contractors: public concern over how government 
money is spent and political pressure imposed on elected judges by 
newspapers and other “open government” advocates. 
Citizens are legitimately concerned about how government funds 
are spent,194 the PRA was intended to enable people to act on this con-
cern,195 and judges may decide that this policy is more important than 
competing principles.  Other states subject private recipients of public 
funds to public records laws,196 either by statute,197 or by case law.198  
                                                                                                             
Clarke’s holding, the recipients might fall under the PRA, even though little funding originates from 
the City of Seattle itself. 
 193. See Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, 144 Wash. App. 185, 194, 181 
P.3d 881, 885–86 (2008) (distinguishing between delegating “performance authority” and “statutory 
responsibility”). 
 194. See Yakima Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Yakima, 77 Wash. App. 319, 328, 890 P.2d 544, 
549 (1995). 
 195. See id. 
 196. See The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, supra note 165. 
 197. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103(5)(A) (2008) (“[Records of] any . . . agency whol-
ly or partially supported by public funds or expending public funds [are subject to the FOIA]”); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.232(d)(iv) (2008) (“[P]ublic body [includes] [a]ny other body which is 
created by state or local authority or which is primarily funded by or through state or local authori-
ty”). 
 198. See, e.g., Cavey v. Walrath, 598 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a 
nonprofit legal aid society receiving more than 50% of its funds from a county is subject to Wiscon-
sin’s Open Records law); Nw. Georgia Health Sys., Inc. v. Times-Journal, Inc., 461 S.E.2d 297, 
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Because judges may consider Washington a laggard behind other states’ 
open records laws, judges could use Telford to expand the PRA’s defini-
tion of “agency.”199  However, Washington’s PRA is open in ways that 
other states’ are not.200  For example, many states limit the large catego-
ries of records available for public inspection.201  Washington, however, 
narrowly exempts classes of records, resulting in most records being 
available to the public.202  Thus, subjecting Washington contractors to the 
PRA will create a result experienced by those in few other states: con-
tractors will be required to release records even marginally related to ac-
tivities paid for with public funds. 
Judges are also likely to expand, or at least not overrule, Clarke’s 
holding to avoid angering the news media and other open government 
advocates.  Open government advocates are vigorously trying to amend 
the Public Records Act to make more records available for public inspec-
tion.203  Although subjecting certain contractors to the PRA might appear 
unreasonable to some judges, they also know that ruling otherwise will 
antagonize powerful open government advocates204 and risk their 
chances for reelection.205  Also, Washington courts are exempt from the 
PRA,206 and judges may not fully appreciate the efforts often required to 
comply with the Act.207  Therefore, judges may continue to push case law 
forward until eventually all government contractors fall under the PRA. 
To conclude, the court of appeals badly erred in its Clarke decision 
by (1) failing to apply the correct rules of statutory construction to the 
                                                                                                             
299–300 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that any entity, business or organization that serves a public 
function, including a non-profit hospital, is subject to the [Georgia Open Records Act]”). 
 199. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(1) (2008). 
 200. See The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, supra note 165; THE BGA-ALPER 
INTEGRITY INDEX (Better Government Assn. ed., 2008) (ranking Washington public records laws 
sixteenth out of the fifty states for openness). 
 201. See The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, supra note 165. 
 202. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.040 (2008). 
 203. For example, the Seattle Times, Washington’s largest newspaper, published twenty-four 
separate editorial or opinion articles within the past thirty-six months either urging for the expansion 
of the PRA or criticizing courts or public officials’ narrower interpretations of the Act. 
 204. For example, the Seattle Times endorsed the challenger to a sitting justice, Mary Fair-
hurst, in part because the newspaper disagreed with Justice Fairhurst’s PRA rulings that sided with 
government agencies.  Editorial, The Times Recommends . . . Bond and Johnson for Supreme Court, 
SEATTLE TIMES, at B10, available at 2008 WLNR 14510533. 
 205. In Washington, judges are elected by the people.  WASH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 3, 5, 30. 
 206. The Washington Supreme Court has determined that the judicial branch is exempt from 
the Public Records Act.  City of Federal Way v. Koenig, 167 Wash. 2d 341, 346, 217 P.3d 1172, 
1174 (2009) (“[T]he courts are not included in the definition of agency, and thus, the PRA does not 
apply to the judiciary.”). 
 207. Aside from the basic inconsistency that the judicial branch of government does not con-
sider itself an “agency” while concluding, at least in Clarke, that private businesses may be, judges 
are never required to experience firsthand any inconveniences caused by the Act or by their PRA 
case law. 
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term “agency”; (2) wrongfully choosing to apply the Telford four-factor 
test to a privately owned and operated organization; and (3) bungling its 
application of Telford, which, if properly performed, would necessarily 
find that an independent business cannot be an agency under the Act.  
Clarke’s precedent also intrudes on the democratic process and, if al-
lowed to remain and if extended, will limit the means by which local leg-
islative bodies can innovate and improve government services.  For these 
reasons, judicial and legislative actions are required. 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Washington Court of Appeals wrongly decided Clarke, in part, 
because the court saw no other means to force TCAC to provide Ms. 
Clarke with records that would help determine whether TCAC followed 
the required euthanasia protocols.208  All attempts to remedy Telford’s 
misapplication should recognize the Clarke court’s dilemma by fixing 
Clarke’s mistaken precedent and by ensuring that records that are created 
to document government-funded activities are made available.  Three 
actions to undo Clarke should be taken.  First, forcefully defend all chal-
lenges using Telford against public contractors to obtain “public” 
records.  Next, amend the Washington Public Records Act’s definition of 
agency to exclude all private organizations not formed by and comprised 
of government officials.  Finally, amend the PRA’s definition of “public 
records” to include records funded by public agencies and produced in 
the performance of a governmental function. 
A.  Forcefully Defend Against Future Telford Cases 
Fortunately, in the two years since Clarke was decided, the case’s 
precedent has made little noticeable effect on government contracting in 
Washington.  Courts have not revisited Telford or Clarke—either by li-
miting the holding to certain types of contractors or by expanding the 
PRA’s reach to include more expenditures of public funds.  Nor is much 
anecdotal evidence available indicating that PRA requestors have so far 
used Clarke to obtain previously unavailable records from contractors.  
However, Clarke has opened the door to government contractors being 
declared agencies under the Act.  It is only a matter of time before citi-
zens request any and all records in the possession of these contractor 
agencies, including personnel and payroll records, business plans, and 
other private records even marginally related to the contractors’ public 
                                                 
 208. See Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, 144 Wash. App. 185, 190, 181 
P.3d 881, 883–84 (2008). 
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contracting function.209  Also, citizens and lawyers may use the PRA as a 
weapon to harass or extract statutory damages against contractors ill-
equipped to follow the Act’s extensive requirements.210  Contractors 
should refuse to comply with such Telford-based requests and vigorously 
defend such refusals in court. 
Unfortunately, defending Telford PRA actions in court may not be 
worth the effort of individual contractors, and concerted action may be 
necessary.  This may be why TCAC chose not to challenge the Clarke 
ruling to the Washington Supreme Court, despite the flimsiness of the 
appeals court’s holding.211  Contractors will find that it is almost always 
cheaper to provide records than to challenge requests in court.212  How-
ever, private organizations and companies that accept public contracts 
and cumulatively absorb PRA costs should contribute money and re-
sources to fight further Telford PRA challenges. 
B.  Amend the Public Records Act’s Definition of “Agency” 
The Washington legislature should amend the Washington Public 
Records Act’s definition of agency to exclude all private organizations 
not formed by and made up of government officials.  The Telford func-
tional-equivalency analysis is proper and effective to expose government 
agencies masquerading as private organizations.213  Thus, amending the 
PRA’s definition of agency214 to preclude all private corporations not 
composed of or managed by government officials will prevent such mas-
querades as were challenged in Telford. 
                                                 
 209. Washington law exempts some narrowly defined subclasses of records, such as certain 
personal records, plans, financial information, preliminary drafts, health care records, and criminal 
investigative information.  See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.56.230–.480 (2008).  Additionally, certain 
exemptions apply in statutes outside of the PRA, such as the protection of trade secrets.  Id. §§ 
4.24.601, 19.108.  However, agency records are to be made available to the public unless a specific 
exemption applies, and even then, exemptions are to be construed narrowly.  Id. §§ 42.56.030, 
.070(1).  For example, a trade secret may be withheld only if it meets the strict requirements of the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  See id. § 19.108. 
 210. See Parts II.B.2 & IV.E, supra. 
 211. See Clarke, 144 Wash. App. at 185, 181 P.3d at 881.  For the purposes of appeal, the 
parties agreed to dismiss the Animal Control Authority of the Cities of Richland, Pasco, and Kenne-
wick from the lawsuit.  Id. at 188, 181 P.3d at 882.  Thus, TCAC would have continued to be on its 
own for a Washington Supreme Court appeal.  See id. 
 212. This is especially true in cases where the contracting agency is not a co-party and thus 
does not assist in providing the defense. 
 213. See Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm’rs, 95 Wash. App. 149, 974 P.2d 886 
(1999), review denied, 138 Wash. 2d 1015, 989 P.2d 1143 (1999) (holding that the Washington State 
Association of Counties (WSAC) and the Washington Association of County Officials (WACO) are 
“other local agencies” under the Public Disclosure Act). 
 214. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(1) (2008). 
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The Washington legislature should redefine “agency” by borrowing 
from other states’ statutes.  Mississippi offers an excellent example of an 
agency definition because it clearly defines the public bodies covered by 
the Act,215 covers “pretend” private organizations WSAC and WACO,216 
and excludes private organizations and corporations.217  Thus, the defini-
tion of agency under the Act should limit “other agencies” to those 
“created by the Constitution or by law, executive order, ordinance or res-
olution.”218 
C.  Amend the Public Records Act’s Definition of “Public Record” 
Finally, the legislature should amend the Public Records Act’s de-
finition of “public record”219 to include records “paid for to comply with 
[the] public contracting requirements” of any state or local agency.220  
This would ensure that records relevant to publicly funded work are 
available for inspection by the public without opening up broader catego-
ries of records that “agencies” under the Act are required to provide.  
Also, records would be made available through the contracting agency, 
not the contractor itself. 
If this amended PRA definition of “public record” had been in 
place when Clarke was decided, the court would have never performed a 
Telford functional-equivalency test or found that TCAC was an “other 
local public agency.”221  Instead, the Animal Control Authority of Rich-
                                                 
 215. MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-61-3(a) (2008) (“‘Public body’ shall mean any department, bu-
reau, division, council, commission, committee, subcommittee, board, agency and any other entity of 
the state or a political subdivision thereof, and any municipal corporation and any other entity 
created by the Constitution or by law, executive order, ordinance or resolution.”). 
 216. WSAC and WACO were created by state law.  Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 154, 974 P.2d at 
889–90. 
 217. Private entities not “created by the Constitution or by law, executive order, ordinance or 
resolution,” are not covered by Mississippi’s public records laws.  See MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-61-
3(a) (2008). 
 218. The definition of “agency” under WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(2) would be amended to: 
“Agency” shall include all state agencies and all local agencies.  “State agency” includes 
every . . . or other state agency created by the Constitution or by law, executive order, or-
dinance or resolution.  ‘Local agency’ includes every . . . or other state agency created by 
the Constitution or by law, executive order, ordinance or resolution.  (Amended language 
in italics.) 
 219. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(2) (2008) (“‘Public Record’ includes any writing contain-
ing information relating to the conduct of government or the performance of any governmental or 
proprietary function prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency . . . .”). 
 220. The definition of “public record” under WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(2) would be 
amended to: “‘Public Record’ includes any writing containing information relating to the conduct of 
government or the performance of any governmental or proprietary function prepared, owned, used, 
retained, or paid for to comply with public contracting requirements by any state or local agen-
cy . . . .”  (Amended language in italics.) 
 221. See Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, 144 Wash. App. 185, 190, 181 
P.3d 881, 883 (2008).  The court considered whether the Animal Control Authority of Richland, 
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land, Pasco, and Kennewick would have been required to obtain the eu-
thanasia logbooks from TCAC and provide copies to Ms. Clarke. 
This proposed amendment limiting disclosure to actions “paid for” 
by public funds and done in the performance of contracted governmental 
work benefits all parties (requestor, contractor, and contracting govern-
ment agency) for several reasons.  First, courts will properly exclude all 
records held by the contractor not directly related to the governmental 
function.222  Next, contractors will not be required to interact directly 
with PRA requestors.223  Instead, requests will be funneled through the 
contracting agency, and the contractor will be responsible only for send-
ing copies of responsive records directly to that agency.224  This process 
is already followed by agencies that have “used” records possessed by 
private entities.225  Third, under the amended public record definition, 
contractors will face few of the effects of being designated a public 
agency, and thus, they will incur far fewer costs in time, training, and 
resources.  Although this change may create some conflicts between con-
tractors and contracting agencies,226 the benefits to the contractor far 
                                                                                                             
Pasco, and Kennewick had used the euthanasia records in question.  Id.  The court found, however, 
that “[i]t is not clear from the record whether ACA used the records in question preparing its sum-
mary statistics of TCAC’s activity.”  Id.  If the court had instead inquired whether the logbooks had 
been paid for with public funds and related to the performance of a contracted-for  government func-
tion, the court would have answered yes and required the record’s release. 
 222. Records held by the contractor but not directly related to carrying out the contracting 
function, including the company’s accounting information, personnel files, trade secrets, etcetera, 
would not be designated as “public records” under the amended definition.  Thus, contractors would 
not be required to provide access to all records as they would be required to do under current PRA 
language if found to be an “other local public agency.” 
 223. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.56.070–.080 (2008). 
 224. See id.  Under my proposed amendments, contractors do not fall under the requirements 
of WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.56.070–.080 because they are not “agencies,” and thus, they are not 
required to maintain indexes, respond directly to non-agency requestors, or make their records pub-
licly available to requestors.  See id.  The contracting public agency would instead be responsible for 
this, as they already do for their existing PRA requests. 
 225. See id. § 42.56.010(2).  The Washington Supreme Court determined that private records 
that are submitted to a public agency concerning some government action may become “public 
records” subject to the Act if they are “used” by that public agency in the “conduct of government.”  
The Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v. Johnson, 135 Wash. 2d 734, 958 P.2d 260 
(1998).  The court also determined that records in the possession of private entities may fall under 
the PRA if they were “used” by an agency and impacted the agency’s decision-making process, even 
if the records were never in the agency’s possession.  Concerned Ratepayers Ass’n v. Pub. Util. Dist. 
No. 1 of Clark County, 138 Wash. 2d 950, 983 P.2d 635 (1999).  For an in-depth analysis about the 
impact of these decisions, see Michael R. Kenyon & Stephen R. King, Government Contractors and 
the Washington Public Disclosure Act: When Private Documents Become Public Records, 509 MUN. 
RES. & SERVICES CENTER WASH. INFO. BULL. 8a-1, 8a-5 (2001). 
 226. For example, contractors may not want to provide contracting agencies access to certain 
records that may be exempt, and challenges by the agency (or citizen through the agency) might 
create complications.  Also, the contracting agency might use this amendment to audit the contractor 
in ways that the contractor did not anticipate upon execution of the contract. 
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outweigh the alternative ramifications of being designated a “public 
agency.”  Finally, the PRA’s purpose and integrity will be maintained 
because citizens will be able to oversee how government money is spent 
and how work is performed, regardless of the type of government func-
tion227 or if the function was performed by a government agency or con-
tractor.  The Clarke court should not have misapplied Telford to “solve” 
a perceived lack of open government, and other private contracting enti-
ties should fight hard to prevent any further cases from reaching a similar 
conclusion.  However, a more effective and permanent solution to this 
apparent lack of transparency is for the legislature to amend the PRA’s 
“agency” and “public record” definitions so that records relating to pub-
lic services provided by private contractors are considered public 
records, but citizens will need to request these records from the contract-
ing agencies.  This solution provides government accountability without 
holding private contractors to legal responsibilities and consequences 
that they are ill-equipped to handle. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Washington Court of Appeals decision in Clarke misapplied 
the precedent in Telford to achieve an absurd result that the drafters of 
the original Public Records Act never intended: designating private com-
panies as public agencies.  On the surface, Clarke’s result may seem fair 
and true to the PRA’s purpose because the ruling granted citizens the 
ability to monitor how their government exercised police powers by eu-
thanizing animals.  However, Clarke’s precedent, if allowed to expand, 
threatens to pull all public contractors within the Public Records Act’s 
reach.  Does the public really want all private social service agencies, 
public works contractors, humane societies, and other private entities 
with which governments contract to be subject to the Act regardless of 
the government-related content of their records?  Is there a better way of 
protecting the public’s right to know how their state and local govern-
ments operate and allocate resources without declaring that all govern-
ment contractors are agencies under the PRA?  Would the public prefer 
the legislature, not the courts, to set this policy?  By amending the Public 
Records Act to consider the governmental nature of records rather than 
the status of an entity as a state or local agency, the Washington legisla-
ture would protect the integrity of the Act while eliminating Clarke’s 
potentially harmful effects on government contractors and agencies. 
                                                 
 227. This amendment removes the inconsistent result whereby one contractor, such as the Tri-
Cities Animal Care and Control Shelter, is subject to the PRA while another contractor, such as the 
West Central Community Development Association, is immune from the Act. 
